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I. INTRODUCrION
The Helms-Burton Act, or the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Soli-
darity (LIBERTAD) Act' as it is officially known, is one of the most
controversial pieces of legislation signed by President Clinton during his
first term. Despite the controversy, many Americans have never heard of
the Libertad Act. The reason for this is that the Act's most disputed as-
pect is its attempt to apply U.S. law extraterritorially. Congress passed
the Libertad Act with the intended goal of tightening the U.S. embargo
against Cuba and speeding the ouster of Fidel Castro, but the result has
been just the opposite. The Act's infringement on the sovereignty of U.S.
allies and other nations around the world has sparked angry and pointed
responses which aim to neutralize the effect of the Libertad Act and call
into question the justification for the continued American embargo of
Cuba. This comment seeks to (1) evaluate the events leading up to pas-
sage of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, (2) explain the
Act's substantive provisions, (3) examine its violations of international
law, and (4) analyze the legal steps taken by major U.S. trading partners
in response to the Act. These steps include the passage of UN resolu-
tions, the adoption of legal countermeasures, and the filing of a com-
plaint before the World Trade Organization.
II. EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE ACT
A. The Embargo
Shortly after coming to power,2 Fidel Castro nationalized all large
commercial interests in Cuba in August 1960.3 Within two years, Castro's
1. Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-114, 110 Stat. 785 (1996). The Helms-Burton Act, Libertad Act, and Cuban Liberty
and Democratic Solidarity Act are used interchangeably to refer to the legislation that is
the topic of this comment.
2. See Richard D. Porotsky, Economic Coercion and the General Assembly: A Post-
Cold War Assessment of the Legality and Utility of the Thirty-Five-Year Old Embargo
Against Cuba, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 901, 908 (1995). Castro took power in 1959
by launching a revolt against the repressive Batista regime. Id.
3. Id. at 909. In 1954, the Department of Justice created an agency called the For-
eign Claims Settlement Commission (FCSC) pursuant to the International Claims Settle-
ment Act of 1949. Arthur Golden, Accounts Receivable, SAN DiEGo UNION-TPIB., Sept.
26, 1996, at I-1. The FCSC's function is to certify the claims of U.S. citizens whose
overseas property has been seized by foreign governments without adequate compensa-
tion. Id. Once certified, the claims are presented to the State Department which negotiates
with foreign governments for their payment. Id.
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relations with the United States had deteriorated to the point that Presi-
dent Kennedy formally instituted a trade embargo against Cuba on Febru-
ary 3, 1962. 4 The embargo's purpose was to economically and politically
strangle the Castro regime out of power. At its outset, the embargo pro-
hibited all financial and trade transactions with Cuba by persons subject
to U.S. jurisdiction.5 Castro, defiant against U.S. attempts to isolate his
government, rapidly forged links with the socialist bloc to fill the eco-
nomic void left by the embargo instituted by the United States and sup-
ported by many American allies.6 Meanwhile, the only recourse for those
American citizens and corporations whose Cuban property had been na-
tionalized was to certify the amount of their loss with the Foreign Claims
Settlement Commission and hope for an eventual settlement of these
claims with the Cuban government.
For the next thirty years, successive U.S. administrations maintained
the embargo on the ground that Cuba represented a communist threat to
U.S. security.7 With the collapse of the former Soviet Union in 1991, this
justification for the embargo ceased to exist in the eyes of many around
the world, yet the United States has doggedly perservered in enforcing it.
B. The Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 and Growing Foreign Criticism
The collapse of the Soviet Union brought an end to its $5 to $6 bil-
lion in annual subsidies to Cuba, and the island plunged into a lasting re-
cession.8 Between 1989 and 1994, the Cuban economy contracted by 35
percent because of the cutoff of Soviet aid. 9 The U.S. Congress passed
the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 specifically seeking to exploit the po-
tential for a transition to democracy that this economic hardship pro-
vided. 10 The Cuban Democracy Act tightened the existing embargo using
mechanisms to accomplish this goal which angered the international com-
munity." Foremost, the Cuban Democracy Act abolished the U.S. system
By 1968, about 6000 U.S. corporations and citizens who lost property in Cuba when
Castro nationalized their assets had claims certified by the FSCS. Id. These claims were
worth about $1.8 billion in the 1960s and, with interest, are now worth about $5.6 billion.
Steve Fairnaru, U.S. Firms Haven't Closed Book on Cuba, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 29,
1996, at Al.
4. Porotsky, supra note 2, at 906.
5. Id.
6. id. at 910.
7. Id. at 912.
8. Porotsky, supra note 2, at 913.
9. Cuba Expects GDP to Grow, STAR TRIBUNE, Mar. 12, 1997, at 3D.
10. See Gabriel M. Wilner, International Reaction to the Cuban Democracy Act, 8
FLA. J. INT'L L. 401, 402 (1993).
11. Id.
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of granting licenses to do business with Cuba to the foreign subsidiaries
of American companies.' 2 This license system had enabled these subsidi-
aries to trade with Cuba while such trade remained forbidden to their
American parents. 3 The European Community and others opposed the
elimination of the licensing process because it forced the subsidiaries op-
erating within their sovereign territories to comply with the U.S. foreign
policy objectives in Cuba by subjecting them to penalties under Ameri-
can law for trading with the island.' 4 From the perspective of American
trade partners, this amounted to the extraterritorial application of U.S.
law in violation of principles of international law. 5 Further, not only did
the Cuban Democracy Act attempt to reach the foreign subsidiaries of
U.S. companies, it also took the more egregious step of setting up a sec-
ondary boycott by denying some foreign companies, with no American
parent company or other ties to the United States, the right to trade with
the United States if they did business with Cuba.16 Though this secondary
boycott applied only to the shipping industry, 17 its operation to bar any
ship from entering an American port if that ship had visited a Cuban port
within the previous six months was ill-received by the international
community.'8
After the enactment of the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, Cuba in-
itiated a series of United Nations resolutions relating to the embargo in
an attempt to capitalize on this international annoyance with the Cuban
Democracy Act and prior embargo legislation.19 Without naming the
United States specifically, the resolutions condemned the promulgation of
laws by member states which infringe on the sovereignty of other
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. See Porotsky, supra note 2, at 914.
16. See Wilner, supra note 10, at 402.
17. Id.
18. See Porotsky, supra note 2, at 914. Although the statutory language of the Cu-
ban Democracy Act did not provide for other secondary boycotts, the practical effect of
the Act and prior U.S. embargo laws was to create such boycotts. See Wilner, supra note
10, at 402. For example, non-U.S. companies were prevented from selling their goods in
the United States if the goods contained a certain percentage of Cuban inputs. Id. at 403.
Foreign-owned banks which operate exclusively outside the United States were forbidden
by the U.S. government from maintaining Cuban accounts in U.S. dollars or conducting
commercial transactions in U.S. dollars with Cuba. Id. Lastly, the United States exerted
informal pressure on non-U.S. companies to avoid trade with Cuba. Foreign companies
often yielded because of the possibility of future legal ramifications, a turn of events
made credible by the ever-growing body of U.S. embargo legislation at the time. Id.
19. See U.N. Again Calls on U.S. to End Embargo of Cuba, BALIMORE SUN, Nov.
13, 1996, at 16A.
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states.20 The resolutions called for nations of the world which had en-
acted extraterritorial legislation in order to maintain the embargo against
Cuba to repeal such laws.21 It was within this swirl of growing criticism
of unilateral American legislation concerning Cuba and its extraterritorial
effects that the Helms-Burton bill was born.22
III. THE CUBAN LIBERTY AND DEMOCRATIC SOLIDARITY ACT
A. Genesis
Drafting of the Helms-Burton legislation began in the summer of
1995.23 It started as an attempt to allow U.S. nationals of all descents to
recover damages for their expropriated foreign property.24 When the far-
reaching implications of such broadly worded legislation were consid-
ered, the bill was quickly narrowed to deal only with confiscated prop-
erty in Cuba.25 The legislation's development over the next year was
shaped by key external forces such as the 1996 U.S. presidential election
race and the downing of two private American planes by the Cuban Air
Force on February 24, 1996.26 Later versions of the Act retained only the
slightest resemblance to its original premise. 27 Just as President Bush had
opposed the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 and later signed it under
candidate Clinton's pressure, 2 the Clinton White House initially disap-
proved of the Helms-Burton bill until election year politics and the
downing of the planes forced the administration to capitulate. 29 When
20. See Wilner, supra note 10, at 406.
21. See Porotsky, supra note 2, at 940-41, n.207 (citing the full text of the first of
these U.N. resolutions, G.A. Res. 47/19, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Agenda Item 39, 70th
plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/47/19 (1992)).
22. See generally Wilner, supra note 10, at 405.
23. See Ann Davis, Helms to Cuba: See You in Court, NAT'L L.J., July 10, 1995, at
Al (explaining how Helms staffers drastically rewrote the legislation after receiving feed-
back from international lawyers).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. David E. Sanger, U.S. Rejects Role for World Court in Trade Dispute, N.Y.
TIMms, Feb. 21, 1997, at A9. For a chronicle of the events and personalities behind the
shoot down of the Brothers to the Rescue planes, see Jefferson Morley, Shoot Down,
WASH. POST, May 25, 1997, at W8.
27. See Davis, supra note 23, at Al.
28. See David Rieff, From Exiles to Immigrants, FOREIGN AFF., July/August 1995, at
86.
29. See 142 CONG. REc. S1510 (1996) (quoting a letter from President Clinton to
Congress indicating the White House's change of heart on the Helms-Burton legislation:
"The atrocity over the Florida straits-the murder of matyrs of February 24-has galva-
nized opposition to Castro. And it has overcome obstacles to passing their Libertad bill
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Clinton finally signed the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act
into law in July 1996, he immediately exercised his authority under the
Act to suspend its most draconian provisions for six months in order to
appease international reproach of the Act's extraterritorial reach.30 Presi-
dent Clinton resuspended these provisions for six months in early Janu-
ary 199731 and again in July 1997.32 Despite the Administration's effort
to placate foreign critics by suspending the bill's main impact, the inter-
national storm over the Libertad Act rages on.
B. Substantive Provisions of the Libertad Act
In its final form, the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act
of 1996 consists of four titles, the most controversial of which is Title
In.
1. Title I
Title I reaffirms American commitment to enforcing the embargo
against Cuba and expresses congressional resolve to strengthen the ex-
isting embargo.3 3 Beyond providing a tone-setting introduction, several
before us today."). The downing of the planes ensured that Title III, which had been
ejected from the Senate version of the bill in October 1995, was reincorporated into the
Act in the House of Representatives.
Clinton's signing of the Libertad Act was also seen as an attempt to capture the Cu-
ban-American vote in the important states of Florida and New Jersey. See U.S.-EU Trade
War Unlikely to Erupt, STRAITS TiwMs (Singapore), Aug. 17, 1996, at 28.
In any event, the shooting down of the Brothers to the Rescue planes resuscitated
new life into the Helms-Burton bill which, despite its relative unimportance to domestic
or foreign affairs, had previously consumed a disproportionate amount of Congress's time
in the eyes of some members: "Let us remember what is about to occur shortly in this
Chamber. As of midnight tonight, the Federal Government ceases all but essential ser-
vices. . . . Even if it were not in the throes of a critical fiscal crisis, I would still argue
the priorities of the leadership in taking up this particular bill at this juncture.. . . Fidel
Castro has been around for more than three decades. . . . [T]his legislation is nothing
more than special interest legislation par excellence." 141 CONG. REc. S16974 (1995).
30. Sanger, supra note 26.
31. Joel Glass, U.S.A.: Clinton Extends Helms-Burton Act, REUTERS TEXTLINE
LLOYDS LIST, Jan. 6, 1997, available in LEXIS, World Library, TXTNWS File.
32. The White House: Statement By the President, M2 PRESswiIE, July 18, 1997,
available in LEXIS, Market Library, IACNWS File.
33. Libertad Act, § 101, 110 Stat. at 792. Title I also provides for the continuation
of television broadcasting to Cuba via Television Marti. Id. § 107, 110 Stat. at 798. Tele-
vision Marti, which is supposed to provide Cubans with news from an American perspec-
tive, has been widely criticized as a waste of taxpayer money since its signal is effec-
tively jammed by the Castro government. Yet, Congress overlooks this reality in the
findings prefacing the Libertad Act, asserting that, "Radio Marti and Television Marti
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sections of Title I are noteworthy in that they subordinate important for-
eign policy decisions, which arguably should be decided independently,
to events related to Cuba. Section 104 states that the United States will
continue to oppose the. admission of Cuba to international financial insti-
tutions such as the International Monetary Fund.34 Section 106 requires
the President to withhold assistance to the independent states of the for-
mer Soviet Union in direct proportion to the aid they give to Cuban in-
telligence facilities, 35 while section 111 creates a similar prohibition on
aid to countries supporting the completion of a Cuban nuclear facility.36
In the words of Senator Dodd, Title I, although not the widely contested
part of the Act, nevertheless shows America's obsession with Cuba be-
cause "it places some contingencies on other foreign policy matters that
ought to be of greater weight than what we are presently doing or not
doing in Cuba. ' 37
2. Title II
Title II of the Act outlines what future U.S. policy will be regard-
ing, first, a post-Castro transitional government and, subsequently, a dem-
ocratically elected government in Cuba.38 Title II mandates that the Presi-
dent develop a plan for assisting the government which succeeds the
Castro regime. 39 A host of benefits available to the two designated phases
of post-Castro government in Cuba are listed.4 For the transition govern-
ment, they include humanitarian help, lifting of travel restrictions, and
whatever measures the President certifies to Congress as "essential to the
successful completion of the transition to democracy."' 41 For a democrati-
cally elected government, Title II pledges assistance with economic de-
have both been effective vehicles for providing the people of Cuba with news and infor-
mation and have helped to bolster the morale of the people of Cuba living under tyr-
anny." Id. § 2, 110 Stat. at 786. The President is authorized to establish an exchange of
news bureaus with Cuba upon condition of unrestricted press coverage and reciprocity. Id.
§ 114, 110 Stat. at 803.
34. Id. § 104, 110 Stat. at 794-795. During congressional debates on the bill, Sena-
tor Christopher Dodd (D-CT) pointed out that the IMF and other world financial institu-
tions played a critical role in Russia's transition to democracy. In his eyes, continuing to
deny Cuba this assistance undermines the lessons learned about its importance in disman-
tling command economies. 141 CONG. REc. S16974, 16975-16976 (1995).
35. Id. § 106, 110 Stat. at 797.
36. Id. § 111, 110 Stat. at 802.
37. 141 CONG. REc. S16975 (1995).
38. Libertad Act, §§ 201-204, 110 Stat. at 805-811.
39. Id. § 202, 110 Stat. at 806.
40. Id. at 806-807.
41. Id. at 807.
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velopment through various U.S. institutions such as the Export-Import
Bank, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, and the Trade and
Development Agency; preparing Cuban military forces for adjustment to
a democratic government; and advocacy by the President on behalf of
Cuba on the world stage. 42 Accession to the North American Free Trade
Agreement and extension of most-favored-nation trade treatment are
listed as a second tier of possibilities that the President must work on
with Congress following his determination that a democratically elected
government exists in Cuba.43 Detailed prerequisites are set forth that must
be met by a transitional government or democratically elected govern-
ment before such assistance can be offered and the embargo can be
lifted."
3. Title HI
The heart of the Libertad Act is Title III, which creates a private
civil right of action for U.S. nationals against "traffickers" in property
which was confiscated by the Cuban government on or after January 1,
1959. 45 The term "traffics" is so broadly defined as to cover nearly
every conceivable knowing tie to confiscated property in Cuba other than
"the delivery of telecommunication signals to Cuba, . . . the trading or
holding of securities publicly traded or held, . . .uses of property inci-
dent to lawful travel to Cuba .... or transactions and uses of property by
a person who is both a citizen of Cuba and a resident of Cuba, and who
is not an official of the Cuban government." 46
The private civil remedy permits recovery in the form of money
damages for the greater of either the amount of a claim certified by the
Foreign Claims Settlement Commission during the 1960s or an amount
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. §§ 204-206, 110 Stat. at 810-813. Qualifying as a "transition government"
such that assistance from the U.S. can be authorized, entails that the post-Castro govern-
ment fulfill eight conditions. §§ 205-206, 110 Stat. at 811-813. There was debate in the
Senate about the appropriate level of specificity for these requirements. Some advocated
scrapping the requirements altogether because of a fear that they might tie the hands of
future administrations from assisting a transition to democracy in Cuba. 141 CONG. REC.
S15316 (1995). Examples of contested provisions include requirements that the post-
Castro government "legalize all political activity" and make "public commitments" to
organizing free elections, establishing an independent judiciary, and respecting interna-
tionally recognized human rights. See Libertad Act, §§ 204-206, 110 Stat. at 810-813.
This language is open to many differing interpretations. 141 CONG. REC. S15316 (1995).
45. Libertad Act, § 302, 110 Stat. at 815.
46. Id. § 401, 110 Stat. at 823-824.
[Vol. 21
1997] CUBAN LIBERTY & DEMOCRATIC SOLIDARITY ACT 287
determined by the court through a special master.47 Recovery for interest
and court fees is permitted, and damages are automatically trebled for ac-
tions brought on certified claims or on uncertified claims where the
claimant has given the intended defendant thirty days notice of the fact
that he owns a stake in or is trafficking in property in violation of the
Libertad Act.4
Several details significant to recovery by claimants and the operation
of the Act are buried deeper within Title III. First, U.S. nationals who
were eligible to certify a claim of confiscated Cuban property under the
International Claims Settlement Act of 1949 and did not do so are barred
from bringing an action under the Libertad Act for such a claim.49 Sec-
ond, U.S. nationals whose claims were not eligible for certification dur-
ing the 1960s, because they were Cuban refugees and not yet U.S. citi-
zens at that time, must wait two years from the date of enactment of the
Act before bringing an action. 0 Essentially, this gives certified claimants
a two-year headstart in the litigation process. Third, the Act imposes a
substantial amount in controversy requirement5' which may limit the
number of lawsuits that it generates. In order to bring an action under the
Libertad Act, the expropriated property claim must exceed $50,000, "ex-
clusive of interest, costs, and attorneys' fees."'5 2 The news media has
made note of the fact that this high threshold amount precludes all but
the wealthiest property holders from bringing claims.53 The middle-class
Cuban of 1959, now a U.S. citizen otherwise eligible to bring a Title HI
claim, was unlikely to have owned property worth $50,000 at the time of
nationalization.5 4
The suspension provision provides the President with the authority
to postpone the effectiveness of Title III for successive six month inter-
47. Id. §§ 302-303, 110 Stat. at 815-820.
48. Id. § 302, 110 Stat. at 816.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 817.
52. Id.
53. See 142 CONG. RFc. E309 (incorporating the following article into the record:
Louis F. Desloge, The Greatest Embargo Scam-A Little Known Loophole Will Allow the
Richest to Cash In, WASH. POST, Mar. 3, 1996).
54. If the amount in controversy does not bar the claims of former middle-class
Cubans who have since become U.S. citizens, then the exclusion of "real property used
for residential purposes" from the definition of "property" as used in Title III likely will.
See Libertad Act § 4, 110 Stat. at 790. That this limitation is meant to protect the Cuban
people from hardship is discernible from the fact that real property occupied by "an offi-
cial of the Cuba government or the ruling political party in Cuba" is not excluded from
possible claims. Id. In any event, certified claims are not subject to the residential exclu-
sion. Id.
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vals.55 In order to exercise this authority, the President must report in
writing to Congress that "the suspension is necessary to the national in-
terests of the United States and will expedite a transition to democracy in
Cuba." 56
This power to suspend Title III has assumed great importance in
Clinton's diplomatic efforts with U.S. trading partners angry over the ex-
traterritorial effects of the Act.57 Shortly after suspending Title III for the
first time in July 1996, President Clinton dispatched then Undersecretary
of Commerce Stuart Eizenstat to smooth over relations with offended al-
lies and trading partners.5 Meanwhile, the President warned Europe that
he would not resuspend Title III if the EU failed to lobby more actively
for human rights improvements in Cuba.59 The EU tactfully responded to
this presidential posturing by providing Clinton with the tools he needed
to justify to Congress suspensions of Title IlI in January 1997,60 but re-
mained unchanged in its opposition to Helms-Burton. 6' As part of its ef-
forts to appear tougher on Cuba, the EU Council adopted a "Common
Position" stating that its intent to "be Cuba's partner in the progressive
and irreversible opening of the Cuban economy" depended on "improve-
ments in human rights and political freedoms. ' 62 In addition, European
business leaders offered an olive branch by saying that their investment
efforts in Cuba would be directed at benefitting the people rather than
the government. 63 President Clinton made clear that such "momentum"
against Castro had to be maintained in order for him to extend future
suspensions. 64 As a result, this diplomatic dance with trade partners con-
tinued, and the President was able to justify another suspension of Title
III in July 1997.65 As a justification of the latest suspension, the Presi-
55. Id. § 306, 110 Stat. at 819-820.
56. Id.
57. See Martin Walker, Clinton Rewards Tough EU Line on Cuba, GUARDIAN, Jan.
4, 1997, at 12, available in LEXIS, World Library, GUARDN File.
58. Id.
59. See Glass, supra note 31.
60. EUIUnited States/Cuba, REUTERS TEXTLINE LLOYDS LIST, Jan. 6, 1997, available
in LEXIS, World Library, TXTNWS File.
61. Zecchini Laurent, Bill Clinton repousse de six mois la mise en oeuvre complete
de l'embargo contre Cuba; Une disposition de la loi Helms-Burton a nouveau suspendue
[Clinton Again Suspends Helms-Burton for Six Months], LE MONDE, Jan. 6, 1996, Sec.
International, available in LEXIS, World Library, TXTLNE File.
62. Common Position of 2 December 1996, 1996 OJ. (L 322) 1.
63. See Glass, supra note 31.
64. Nancy Dunne, Clinton Suspends Helms-Burton Again, FIN. TIMES (London), Jan.
4, 1997, at 3.
65. U.S. Sanctions Law a Flop, Cuba Says, as Foreign Investment Surges Twenty-
Five Percent, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, June 11, 1997, available in LEXIS, World Li-
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dent's accompanying report to Congress cited gains in the efforts of trad-
ing partners to "promote democratic transition in Cuba. '"
4. Title IV
Unlike Title III, the provisions of Title IV became effective immedi-
ately upon President Clinton's signing of the Libertad Act. Title IV cre-
ates an additional penalty on foreigners who traffic in the confiscated
property of U.S. nationals by denying these foreigners visas to enter the
United States. 67 The visa ban includes corporate officers, principals,
shareholders with controlling interests in entities which have been in-
volved in the confiscation or trafficking of relevant property, and even
their spouses and minor children. 6 The United States has already denied
visas to executives of foreign companies based in Canada, Mexico, and
Italy and to their families. 69
C. Title III Loopholes and Other Problems
1. The Strategy of Settlements
The core of the Libertad Act, Title III, has several large loopholes,
the existence of which the media and some in Congress attribute to the
power of special interest groups. 70 The advantages that these loopholes
bestow on certain subsets of the American population casts doubt upon
the sincerity of the Act's Title I mission and, at the same time, fuels an-
ger abroad. 71 While the purported goal of the Act is to discourage foreign
brary, TXTNWS File.
66. See id.
67. Libertad Act, § 401, 110 Stat. at 822.
68. Id.
69. Stephen Bates & John Palmer, EU Unites in Defiance of U.S. Curbs, GUARDIAN,
Oct. 29, 1996, at 14, available in LEXIS, World Library, GUARDN File. In March 1997,
the Clinton administration denied visas to four members of the board of directors of the
Canadian firm, Sherritt International Corp., because the company operates a nickel mine
in Cuba that was expropriated from a U.S. corporation. See Norman Kempster, Walmart
May Face Sanctions over Cuban PJs, Los ANGELES TIMEs, Mar. 15, 1997, at D1. Seven
other Sherritt employees were denied visas in 1996. Id.
70. See 142 CONG. REc. E308 (1996) (statement of Sen. John F. "Jack" Reed (D-
RI) (citing Desloge, supra note 53). The special interests identified in the article include
sugar, tobacco, and rum companies who will be able to sue competitors who are now do-
ing business in Cuba once the suspension on Title HI is lifted. Id. The Helms-Burton Act
was drafted with the help of attorneys Nick Gutierrez, representing the National Sugar
Mill Owners of Cuba and the Cuban Association for the Tobacco Industry, and Ignacio
Sanchez, representing the Bacardi Rum Co. Id.
71. See Davis, supra note 23 (quoting Gary Jarmin of the U.S. Cuba foundation, a
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business investment in Cuba and thereby strengthen the Cuban embargo,
this goal has not materialized.
72
Critics of the Act who predicted that the creation of a private civil
action would have little deterrent effect on foreign investment have been
proven right, though not quite in the way they imagined. 73 The specter of
Title III lawsuits was initially seen as a tool which would enable U.S.
claimants, mostly corporations, who owned assets prior to their nationali-
zation by Castro to harass foreign competitors now using their former
property by threatening impending lawsuits. 74 Faced with the choice of
abandoning profitable Cuban ventures or cutting deals with U.S. claim-
ants, it was predicted that foreign corporations would settle these lawsuits
by giving U.S. claimants a share of their Cuban profits or by compensat-
ing claimants for the assets outright.75 By its express language, the Act
allows for such results: "[A]n action ...may be brought and may be
settled, and a judgment rendered in such action may be enforced, without
obtaining any license or other permission from any agency of the United
States."'76 There was speculation that wealthy claimants might even shop
around for prospective investors in Cuba and offer full releases of their
property claims in exchange for a share of profits or a lump-sum
settlement. 77
2. Sidestepping Titles III and IV
While the predictions of unseemly results due to the Act have come
true, the strategy of profiteering by American claimants which has
emerged is at a level more complex than anticipated. Ironically, the tactic
which has evolved may not be all that bad for foreigners investing in
Cuba. This is because the strategy promotes the elimination of the one
Helms-Burton thorn which still sticks in the side of foreign investors,
namely the Title IV visa denial provision which the State Department
Washington lobbying group, who said of the Helms-Burton Act, "I refer to it as the Ba-
cardi Rum Protection Act."). There may be truth in these words as the President and
CEO of Bacardi-Martini USA Inc. organized a $500-a-plate luncheon for Senator Jesse
Helms (R-NC) in Miami in April 1995. Id.
72. U.S. Sanctions Law a Flop, Cuba Says, as Foreign Investment Surges 25%,
AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, June 11, 1997, available in LEXIS, World Library, TXTNWS
File.
73. See 142 CONG. REc. E309 (1996) (citing Desloge, supra note 53).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Libertad Act § 302, 110 Stat. at 817.
77. See 142 CONG. Rnc. E 308 (statement of Sen. Reed) (citing Desloge, supra note
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continues to enforce.7" The strategy works in this way: (1) American
claimants demand compensation from the foreign investors for using their
expropriated Cuban assets; (2) The foreign investors agree to settle, not
out of the fear of an eventual Title III lawsuit, but rather in order to
evade harassment under the provisions of Title IV; (3) Once a settlement
is reached, the State Department disengages its policy of visa denials
against the senior executives of these foreign companies, enabling them
and their families to resume travel or study in the United States.7 9
A well-documented example of this scenario surfaced in July 1997.
After the Italian telecommunications company, Stet, agreed to compen-
sate ITT for the use of its communications network on Cuba, the State
Department announced that it would no longer take adverse action
against Stet or its executives.80 Thus, the net effect of the Helms-Burton
legislation in this case was a big pay off to an American claimant and a
guarantee to a foreign investor of no further repercussions of any kind
for its business dealings with Cuba."' This settlement embodies the Act's
senseless and corrupt results as well as its failure to stengthen the em-
bargo of Cuba.
3. Constitutional Equal Protection Issues
The Helms-Burton legislation raises constitutional equal protection
issues as well. 82 While the vast majority of Americans are forbidden to
78. See Stephen Bates, Americans Pacified by Payoff for Cuban Deal, GUARDIAN,
July 25, 1997, at 14, available in LEXIS, World Library, GUARDN File.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Objections have been raised on other constitutional grounds as well. Notably,
Senator Paul Simon (D-IL) proposed an amendment to the Libertad Act that would have
lifted the travel restrictions on Americans traveling to Cuba. See 141 CONG. REC. S15320
(1995). The Senator argued that the First Amendment right to free speech is violated by
any limitation on the right to travel that is not justified by overriding requirements of na-
tional security, which he did not see implicated in permitting Americans to travel to
Cuba. Id. at 15322. "[Wle do not just get the Government line on anything .... That
means we ought to have the freedom to travel where there is no risk." 141 CONG. REC.
S15284-85 (1995). Senator Dodd supported the Simon amendment by drawing a parallel
with the lifting of travel restrictions to the former Soviet Union. In the case of the Soviet
Union, Congress decided that contact with Americans would encourage democracy in the
Soviet Union. 141 CONG. REc. S15322 (1995). In practical terms, the travel restrictions to
Cuba are unenforceable since Americans can travel to Cuba via an intermediary country.
141 CONG. REc. S15284, 15285 (1995).
Senator Helms opposed the amendment to lift travel restrictions for several reasons.
He countered the argument that contact would foster democracy by describing Castro's
policy of "tourist apartheid"-isolating "tourists and tourist facilities from the larger Cu-
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profit from economic transactions with Cuba, the select group of claim-
ants discussed above can indirectly siphon off profits from business in
Cuba under the Act.83
Moreover, the constitutionality of allowing redress to Cuban-
Americans for the nationalization of their property is questionable in the
face of a denial of the same private right of action to other ethnic Ameri-
cans whose assets have been nationalized by the governments of their na-
tive countries.14 This particular inequality was among the principal rea-
sons why Title 1HI was initially removed from the Libertad Act in order
to secure its first passage by the Senate.85 However, the House of Repre-
sentatives ultimately prevailed in their demand to reincorporate Title III
into the Act. 6
Despite the foregoing problems, by far the largest problem with Ti-
tle I1 is its extraterritorial reach. Nations around the world insist that the
Libertad Act violates international law, and they have taken diplomatic
ban population." 141 CONG. REc. S15284, 15285 (1995). Helms further indicated that
much travel to Cuba is motivated by the desire of tourists to engage in sex tourism, ex-
ploitation in which he feels Americans should not be involved. Id. Finally, Helms argued
that denying Castro the hard currency of American tourist dollars represents a national se-
curity interest which justifies the restrictions on travel. But see Rieff, supra note 28, at 85
(explaining the perversity of denying the Castro regime U.S. tourist dollars while the Cu-
ban Democracy Act of 1992 provided for an agreement between American telephone car-
riers and the Castro regime that gives the Cuban government a dollar royalty for every
call placed to Cuba, resulting in large hard currency transfers).
The Simon amendment was easily defeated, but it does strike at the two fundamen-
tally opposed views on achieving the ouster of Castro: freezing Cuba out economically
and politically in order to bring Castro to his knees versus increasing contacts with the
Cuban people as a way to encourage democratic change. Over the years, the U.S. has re-
mained the sole staunch advocate of the freeze-out approach. See Gustavo Capdevila,
Former Allies Split by the Blockade on Cuba, INTER PRESS SERVICE, Oct. 16, 1996, avail-
able in LEXIS, World Library, INPRES File; see Wilner, supra note 10, at 401.
83. See 142 CONG. REc. E308, 309 (1996) (Sen. Reed citing Desloge, supra note
53).
84. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 23 (discussing early versions of the Helms-Burton
Act which would have allowed, inter alia, Chinese Americans to sue U.S. companies that
sell garments sewn on what was once their land).
85. See 141 CONG. REc. S15322, 15324 (1995). In debate, Senate Majority Leader
Bob Dole (R-KS) said of the constitutional equal protection issue, "Opponents of this bill
say Title Ill would create a right for Cuban-Americans not enjoyed by Polish-Americans.
They are right. And there is one critical distinction--today, Poland is free while Cuba suf-
fers under the boot of Castro's repression. 141 CONG. REC. S15277 (1995).
Senator Dodd countered, "[T]itle III [has] virtually nothing to do with Cuba and an
awful lot to do with our claims process in this country. While Poland may be free today,
Vietnam and the People's Republic of China are not. That would create unique distinc-
tions for those of Cuban nationality." Id.
86. 142 CONG. REc. S1510 (1996).
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and legal steps to cope with its effect on them. 871t is the Act's extraterri-
toriality and the international backlash over it that warrant a more in-
depth discussion.
IV. VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. The Making and Role of International Law
The worldwide consensus is that the Helms-Burton Act violates in-
ternational law. International law is formed in two principal ways: 1) by
the maturation of widely accepted practices of nations into legal obliga-
tions (customary law), and 2) by purposeful agreement among nations
(law by convention).88 While there is no formal enforcement of interna-
tional law, countries nonetheless abide by it because they recognize the
common benefit of maintaining norms and standards in the international
arena.
89
The United States accepts international law and considers it part of
the law of the United States.90 Like domestic law, the United States sub-
jects international law to the requirements of the Constitution and subor-
dinates it to subsequently adopted law of the United States.9' Simultane-
ously, the United States recognizes and incorporates into its body of law
the evolutions in international law.92 Changes in international law can oc-
cur both as a result of the ratification of new treaties and conventions,
and by the ripening of practices into new customary international law.93
If the change in international law occurs through this process of matura-
tion from practice to legal principle, it is important to note that neither
the United States nor any nation is bound by a law from which it disso-
ciated itself during the process of acceptance and maturation.94
The United States also adheres to the principle that in the event of
an incompatibility between international law and domestic law, "[a]n act
of Congress supersedes an earlier rule of international law or a provision
of an international agreement as law of the United States if the purpose
87. See, e.g.,Canada Announces Measures to Combat Helms-Burton Act, LATIN AM.
L. Bus. RE'., July 31, 1996, available in LEXIS, Market Library, IACNWS File; US-EU
Trade War Unlikely to Erupt, STRAIGHTS TIMES (Singapore), Aug. 17, 1996, at 28, availa-
ble in LEXIS, World Library, STRAIT File.
88. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. pt. I, ch. 1,
Introductory Note (1986).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. § 111.
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of the act to supersede the earlier rule or provision is clear or if the act
and the earlier rule or provison cannot fairly be reconciled." 95 While
Congress thus trumps previous international law in terms of defining the
law of the United States, the United States agrees that it is nonetheless
responsible for the consequences of thereby violating international law.96
B. No Basis for Jurisdiction
With this background, the stage is set to examine what aspects of
international law the United States has violated by passing the Helms-
Burton Act.
Under international law, a distinction is made between "jurisdiction
to prescribe," "jurisdiction to adjudicate," and "jurisdiction to en-
force." 97 Since the ability to file suit under Title III remains suspended,
any discussion of the extraterritoriality of the Helms-Burton Act can as
yet be limited to its violations of the principles of jurisdiction to pre-
scribe. This category of jurisdiction refers to the limitations imposed by
international law on a state's power to make its law applicable in circum-
stances affecting the interests of other states. 98
1. The Jurisdictional Principles of Nationality and Territoriality
Historically, territoriality and nationality have served as the two ac-
cepted bases of jurisdiction to prescribe, 99 and the United States has
given broad interpretation to these concepts of jurisdiction to the dismay
of the international community.' 0
In the case of Title III, the world is correct in alleging that Congress
has transgressed beyond the most far-reaching developments in the con-
cepts of territoriality and nationality. In the past, the jurisdictional con-
cept of nationality has been stretched to reach foreign subsidiaries and
branches of American corporations to reflect "the recognition that mul-
tinational enterprises do not fit neatly into the traditional bases of juris-
diction."'' 1 However, the Helms-Burton Act purports to subject wholly
foreign-owned corporations and foreign nationals with no U.S. ties of
any kind to claims of compensation."' 2 Thus, nationality could not serve
95. Id. § 115.
96. Id.
97. Id. § 401.
98. Id. pt. IV, ch. 1, Introductory Note.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. § 414 cmt. a.
102. See Libertad Act §§ 301-302, 110 Stat. at 814-819. Contrast the jurisdictional
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as a justification for the Act's overbroad jurisdiction.
2. The Effects Doctrine
Instead, Congress relied on the concept of territoriality to justify Ti-
tle 111.103 More specifically, Congress tried to shoehorn the reach of Title
III into an offshoot of territoriality called the "effects doctrine."0 4
According to the Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the
United States, the effects doctrine grants a state jurisdiction to prescribe
law with respect to "conduct outside its territory that has or is intended
to have substantial effect within its territory."' 10 5 Congress recites this
same passage in the Libertad Act as a justification for its extraterritorial
application: "[I]nternational law recognizes that a nation has the ability
to provide for rules of law with respect to conduct outside its territory
that has or is intended to have substantial effect within its territory."'' 0
American trade partners and other nations agree that the effects doc-
trine exists but rightly maintain that it is inapplicable here. The inapplica-
bility of the effects doctrine stems from the fact that jurisdiction under
the Libertad Act is based not on the substantial effect of foreign entities
on the United States, with which they may have absolutely no ties, but
rather rests solely on their relations with Cuba.
3. The Requirement of Reasonableness
Even assuming a weak argument could be made that business deal-
ings with Cuba may still have a "substantial effect" on the United
States, the exercise of jurisdiction fails to pass the second crucial compo-
nent of reasonableness. 0 7 A list of specific factors to determine whether
exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable is given in Section 403 of the Re-
statement of Foreign Relations Law of the United States.108 The easiest
assertion of the Helms-Burton Amendment with President Reagan's executive order im-
posing sanctions against South Africa in 1985 to force change in its system of apartheid.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE U.S. § 414 Reporters' Note 3
(1986). The mandatory rules announced by President Reagan applied only to United
States nationals, a far cry from the Libertad Act's attempt to go so far as to compel the
subsidiaries of United States companies to abide by the sanctions. Id.
103. See Libertad Act § 301, 110 Stat. at 815 (1996).
104. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 402 cmt.
d.
105. Id. § 402.
106. Libertad Act § 301, 110 Stat. at 815.
107. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 403.
108. Id.
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way to reject Helms-Burton as reasonable is to answer the following
question in the negative: Would the United States regard it as reasonable
if other states were to exercise such jurisdiction as is asserted by the pro-
visions of the Helms-Burton Act if the circumstances were reversed?109
American courts have construed the demand of reasonableness when
determining permissible exercises of jurisdiction under international law
as a requirement equivalent to comity."10 The traditional notion of comity
is that its application should be limited to cases where it would be rea-
sonable for either of two states to exercise jurisdiction in a situation
where both wish to do so."' Under such circumstances, comity implores
these sovereigns in conflict to resolve an existing controversy "with re-
straint, cooperation, and good will."" H2
The extraterritoriality of the Helms-Burton Act is so patently unrea-
sonable that the international principle of comity should not even enter
into the analysis. Yet, the U.S. Congress turns to the principle of comity
to justify the Act's reach. Like the effects doctrine, the principle of com-
ity is explicitly referred to in the congressional findings which preface
Title III: "The wrongful confiscation or taking of property belonging to
United States nationals by the Cuban Government, and the subsequent
exploitation of this property at the expense of the rightful owner, under-
mines the comity of nations, the free flow of commerce, and economic
development."" ' 3 Congress's plan seems to have been to cloak the
Libertad Act in reasonableness by relying on the effects doctrine and
then calling upon foreign nations to accept this tortured basis for jurisdic-
tion as a nod to comity.
C. Defying the United Nations
1. Five Consecutive Resolutions
Since 1992, the international community has used the United Na-
tions as one forum in which to address its objections to the extraterrito-
rial effects of the U.S. policy toward Cuba.' 4 After President Clinton
signed into law the Libertad Act of 1996, the United Nations General
Assembly voted to adopt a resolution for the fifth consecutive year con-
109. See id. § 403 Reporters' Note 5.
110. Id. § 403 cmt. a.
111. Id. § 403.
112. Peter Durack, Australia: Conflict and Comity, in ACT OF STATE AND ExTRATER-
RITORIAL REACH 41, 43 (John R. Lacey ed., 1983).
113. Libertad Act § 301, 110 Stat. at 814 (emphasis added).
114. See U.N..Again Calls on U.S. to End Embargo on Cuba, supra note 19, at
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demning U.S.-style extraterritorial embargo laws, wherever they might
exist around the world. 1 5 All fifteen EU member countries, including
Britain, Germany, and the Netherlands who had abstained in 1995, voted
in favor of the 1996 resolution which passed with the biggest approval
margin yet. 16
The first of these Cuban-sponsored resolutions was passed by the
General Assembly in 1992 as an expression of international disapproval
over the Cuban Democracy Act."7 In its first year, the resolution regis-
tered 59 supporting member states, 3 opposing member states, and 71 ab-
stentions."18 With each subsequent year, the resolution garnered more
support from the General Assembly. In 1993, the tally was 88 to 4, with
57 abstentions." 9 In 1994, the resolution condemning the U.S. economic
embargo of Cuba was approved by a vote of 101 to 2, with 48 absten-
tions. 20 France, Canada, Spain, and Mexico were among the notable U.S.
allies who defied the United States by backing the resolution that year.' 21
The resolution was adopted in 1995 by an overall margin of 117 to 3.122
2. United Nations Charter Violations
The 1996 resolution, like its predecessors, was based in large part
on the violations of several specific articles of the United Nations Char-
ter by the collective body of American embargo laws. 23 Articles 39 and
41, considered in tandem, present the strongest argument that the
Libertad Act and previous U.S. embargo laws against Cuba are violations
of international law.' 24 These two articles are interpreted to allow for the
115. Id. The vote was 137-3 with twenty-five abstentions. The three countries which
voted against the resolution were the United States, Israel, and Uzbekistan. Id.
116. Id.
117. Facts on File, Vol. 52, No. 2717, Dec. 21, 1992, at 962.
118. Id.
119. Id. Vol. 53, No. 2769, Dec. 23, 1993, at 958.
120. Id. Vol. 54, No. 2817, Nov. 24, 1994, at 886.
121. Id.
122. Id. Vol. 55, No. 2874, Dec. 31, 1995, at 975.
123. See PETER R. BAEHR & LEON GORDENKER, THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE 1990S
3 (1994). The United Nations Charter consists of rules establishing an organization of
member states whose governments agree to be legally bound by the provisions of the
Charter. Id. The United Nations received the task of developing international law much
like a national parliament, but member states have not sought to exercise this envisioned
authority to legislate such compulsory rules for member states. Id. at 3-4.
124. See Wilner, supra note 10, at 409. The full text of Article 39 of the UN Char-
ter is:
The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace,
breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or
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imposition of economic sanctions when "there is a threat to the
peace.' ' 125 While maintaining international security arguably provided
grounds for the embargo against Cuba before the collapse of the Soviet
Union, Cuba has since ceased to pose a threat to the peace so as to jus-
tify economic sanctions under Articles 39 and 41.126
3. Weight of the Resolutions
The United Nations Charter represents an international agreement to
which the United States is a signatory and to which it is bound under in-
ternational law.127 The Charter confers on the United Nations General As-
sembly the power to impose binding obligations on its members121 when
resolutions refer to the provisions of the Charter.129 Such law-making res-
olutions differ from declaratory resolutions which do not incorporate spe-
cific articles of the charter and thus do not rise to the level of interna-
tional law. 130
Until now, the General Assembly has refrained from referencing
specific charter violations in its resolutions on the topic of the Cuban
embargo. Accordingly, the resolutions should be considered declaratory
in character rather than characterized as law-making. However, even if
specific charter provisions remain absent from future embargo resolu-
tions, the resulting declaratory resolutions are important because they
may mature into customary law over time. 13' Factors such as "how large
a majority [the resolution] commanded and how numerous and important
are the dissenting states, whether it is widely supported . . . . [and]
whether it is confirmed by other practice" determine the impact of such
decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to
maintain or restore international peace and security.
U.N. CHARTER art. 39. The text of Article 41 reads:
The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed
force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon
the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include
complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, pos-
tal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of
diplomatic relations.
id. art. 41.
125. Wilner, supra note 10, at 409.
126. Id.
127. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 102, cmt. h (1986).
128. Id. § 102 cmt. g.
129. Id.
130. Id. § 103 cmt. c.
131. Id. § 102, Reporters' Note 2.
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resolutions on shaping customary law.132 The declaratory pronouncements
of the United Nations also provide some evidence of what the states vot-
ing for the resolutions regard international law to be.'33 Because the reso-
lutions adopted in response to America's Cuban embargo laws drew tre-
mendous support, these resolutions will have a particularly high
evidentiary value if used in a case against the United States. 134
In any event, by passing the Helms-Burton Act and prior embargo
legislation, the United States triggered a fundamental reevaluation of the
legality of the overall embargo. United Nations member states went to
considerable lengths to urge a repeal of the offending American laws, in-
cluding siding with Fidel Castro. 35 The result of this upheaval has been
a broad rejection of the propriety of the embargo against Cuba and a
subsequent backfire of Congress' alleged attempt to strengthen the em-
bargo by enacting the Libertad Act. 36 Meanwhile, the United States con-
tinues to promote the Act as valid U.S. law even though its jurisdictional
reach is not within the accepted limits of international law. 37 This refusal
on behalf of the United States to revoke the Libertad Act prompted
American trading partners to take action to ensure that the United States
would not get away with impunity for its violations of international
law. 38
V. THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE
To accomplish this goal, American trading partners employed two
crafty methods which also served to insulate the sovereignty of trading
partners from any infringements by Title III. The two measures taken
were as follows: 1) the ratification by the EU, Canada, and Mexico of
blocking legislation to counter the Act's extraterritorial effects, and 2) the
filing by the EU of a complaint before the World Trade Organization dis-
pute resolution panel. 39
132. Id.
133. Id. § 103 cmt. c.
134. See id. § 103 Reporters' Note 2.
135. See UN Again Calls on U.S. to End Embargo, supra note 19, at 16A (reporting
that the General Assembly adopted a Cuban-drafted resolution).
136. See, e.g., Bates & Palmer, supra note 69, at 14.
137. See id. § 403 cmt. g. (explaining that if a United States statute is inconsistent
with international law, the statute is nevertheless valid, but its application may give rise
to international responsibility for the United States).
138. Canada Joins EU Challenge on U.S. Laws on Cuba, REUTER EuR. COMMUNrIy
REP., Oct. 2, 1996, available in LEXIS, World Library, REUEC File.
139. Walker, supra note 57, at 12.
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A. Blocking Legislation
1. European Union Legislation
Four years ago with the passage of the Cuban Democracy Act, the
members of the European Union were unable to muster the unanimity
necessary to react legislatively to block the Act's offending provisions.' 40
The fact that the EU successfully ratified such blocking legislation on
October 28, 1996, in response to the Libertad Act,14' shows the depth of
the members' anger over the Act's reach.
a. Hurdle to Enactment
Accomplishing the enactment of the blocking legislation was not
without its problems for the European Commission. 42 The largest obsta-
cle in connection with this feat concerned finding a provision of the
Maastricht Treaty which would grant the European Commission the
power to draw up collective countermeasures. 43 After scouring the
Treaty, the Commission preliminarily identified Article 235 as the provi-
sion giving it such power.1'" This article is a "catch-all clause" which
exists to grant the European Council the necessary power to achieve
objectives of the Community if the Council has not been vested with
such power by any other provision of the Maastricht Treaty.14 As a pre-
requisite to exercising this residual Article 235 power, the Council must
first consult with the European Parliament and then act with unanimity to
approve taking the proposed measure.' 4 Thus, in order to ratify the
140. Wilner, supra note 10, at 405.
141. David Fox, EU Counters the Helms-Burton Act, REUTERS EuR. Bus. REP., Oct.
28, 1996, available in LEXIS, World Library, REUEUB File.
142. Caroline Southey & Hilary Barnes, Danes Block EU Riposte to Cuba Law, FIN.
TIMES (London), Oct. 23, 1996, at 8.
143. EUIU.S.: Commission Tries to Wring Danish Support for Cuba Measure, EuR.
REP., Oct. 26, 1996, available in LEXIS, World Library, EURRPT File.
144. Id.
145. Tom Buerkle, Danes Upset EU's Unity on Cuba Trade; Threat to Veto Anti-
U.S. Effort is Seen as a Retreat From Maastricht, INT'L HERALD TRiu., Oct. 23, 1996, at
news sec.
146. Treaty Establishing the European Community [EC Treaty] art. 235 (as amended
1992), reprinted in 1 C.M.L.R. 573, 716. The full text of Article 235 reads:
If action by the Community should prove necessary to attain, in the course of
the operation of the common market, one of the objectives of the Community
and this Treaty has not provided the necessary powers, the Council shall, acting
unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the Euro-
pean Parliament, take the appropriate measures.
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Helms-Burton blocking legislation, the Council needed the unanimous
support of the fifteen EU-member states. 47
Unity among EU members is rare on any issue requiring a collective
political front,'4 and the ratification of the blocking legislation proved no
different. Its passage was jeopardized when the Danes announced that,
despite their opposition to the Libertad Act, they would not vote for the
blocking legislation. 49 Facing a domestic lawsuit alleging that the gov-
ernment had violated the Danish Constitution by giving up too much
sovereignty to the EU under Article 235,150 Denmark implored the Com-
mission to find a basis other than this broad residual clause on which to
exercise the power necessary to enact the blocking legislation. 15' The Eu-
ropean Commission's legal experts again scoured EU laws and found an
obscure 1968 treaty declaration which clarified that the use of the
residual clause in Article 235 was to be restricted to exceptional circum-
stances. 52 With this treaty incorporated into the text of the blocking pro-
posal, Denmark made the ratification of the countermeasures
unanimous.153
b. Substance of the Countermeasures
Model legislation used to draft the proposed blocking measures was
originally developed to counter U.S. antitrust legislation'54 and included
147. See id. With no provision to override a member state's veto, the Commission's
only recourse in such an event would have been to bring the proposed legislation up for
another vote. See Lorraine Woellert, Denmark Foils EU Attack on U.S. Law, WASH.
TIMEs, Oct. 23, 1996, at B6.
148. European Union member governments have delegated responsibility for trade
negotiations to the European Commission, but have not handed over sovereignty in politi-
cal matters. See Southey & Barnes, supra note 142, at 8.
149. Denmark Confirms It Will Veto EU Retaliation on U.S. over Cuba, AGENCE
FRANCE PRESSE, Oct. 23, 1996, available in LEXIS, World Library, AFP File.
150. Woellert, supra note 147. Not only was the Danish government feeling the
pressure of a lawsuit by eleven plaintiffs, it was fulfilling its promise to be "Euro-
skeptical," a promise which was crucial to the Danes' approval of the Maastricht Treaty
in their second referendum on the issue in 1993. Id.
151. Southey & Barnes, supra note 142, at 8.
152. Fox, supra note 141.
153. Id. Denmark was severely criticized by other EU member states which feared
that the inability to stand up to Washington on this issue would destroy the EU's credibil-
ity. See Buerkle, supra note 140. Some states argued that Article 235 cannot, by its very
operation of requiring unanimity, lead to infringement on a member state's sovereignty.
Id. The whole affair left many within the EU thinking of ways to avoid future require-
ments for unanimity, perhaps by functioning in regional sub-groups on certain issues. Id.
154. Denmark Confirms It Will Veto EU Retaliation on U.S. over Cuba, supra note
149. See generally Durack, supra note 109 (discussing the British model for blocking
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primarily the British Protection of Trading Interests Act of 1980.155 At its
inception, the British Protection of Trading Interests Act contained four
distinct responses to the extraterritorial reach of U.S. antitrust laws. 56 It
was later modified to address the offending provisions of any overseas
law which regulates international trade by way of extraterritorial mea-
sures or damages British trading interests. 57 In its original form, the Brit-
ish act 1) forbade British nationals from responding to demands for in-
formation made by foreign courts or other foreign authorities, 2) stated
that British courts would not enforce overseas judgments for multiple
damages for antitrust violations, 3) offered guidance to those affected by
foreign laws infringing on British sovereignty, and 4) in certain circum-
stances, allowed persons carrying on business in the United Kingdom and
against whom an overseas court had awarded multiple damages to re-
cover those damages in British courts. 5
These same mechanisms form the essence of the EU blocking regu-
lation which entered into force on November 29, 1996. I19 The counter-
measures are aimed at protecting EU business enterprises and individuals
against the extraterritorial effects of the Libertad Act. Article One of the
regulation consists of a statement of purpose and provides for an annex
to the regulation in which are enumerated the laws that the regulation is
meant to counteract.160 Besides the Libertad Act of 1996, the two other
laws currently listed in the annex are the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992
and the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996.161 The Council reserves
the power to add or delete targeted laws from the annex, 162 making it a
tool to combat the extraterritorial application of any future U.S. or other
foreign legislation.
The regulation's substantive protections and requirements apply to
all persons encompassed within a sweeping definition given in Article
Eleven. 6 3 Those persons include all natural persons who are residents of
EU member countries, any legal person incorporated within the Commu-
legislation).
155. See A.V. Lowe, Blocking Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: The British Protection of
Trading Interests Act, 1980, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 257 (1981).
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. William Knighton, Britain: Blocking and Claw-Back, in Acr OF STATE AND Ex-
TRATERRITORIAL REAOc 52, 54 (John R. Lacey ed. 1983).
159. Council Regulation (EC) No. 2271/96, 1996 O.J. (L 309) 1, 4.
160. Id. art. 1, at 2.
161. Id. Annex, at 5-6.
162. Id. Annex, at 5. The Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 is colloquially
known as the D'Amato Bill.
163. Council regulation (EC) No. 2271/96, 1996 O.J. (L 309) 1; art. 1, at 2.
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nity, and any other natural person within the Community under the juris-
diction or control of a member country and acting in a professional
capacity. 164
In the event that the financial interests of such persons are affected
by a law specified in the annex, such as the Libertad Act, they are re-
quired to inform the European Commission within thirty days. 6 A guar-
antee is made that the information they provide to the Commission will
be covered by the obligation of professional secrecy and disclosed only
in connection with legal proceedings, with care taken not to divulge busi-
ness secrets.'66
Article Four contains the non-recognition provision which forms the
heart of the countermeasures. 67 It provides that foreign court judgments
which are based on laws listed in the Annex, such as the Libertad Act,
will not be enforced or recognized in the EU.168
Moreover, all persons protected by the regulation are forbidden by
Article Five from cooperating with the requests of foreign courts relating
to the laws in the Annex and from complying with any aspect of the
targeted laws in any context. 69 For example, a European-based subsidiary
or executive of a U.S. parent company may not obey orders from the
parent to stop "trafficking" in Cuban assets. Apparently, preemptive set-
tlement agreements concerning the Helms-Burton disputes between
American claimants and European investors are permissible under the
EU's regulations. This conclusion is based on the lack of uproar that
transpired when the Italian communications firm, Stet, reached such an
agreement with an American claimant in mid-1997 to escape provisions
of the Act. 170 If this is true, the possibility of negotiating amicable settle-
ments softens the impact of the EU non-compliance legislation.
Furthermore, the policy of mandatory non-compliance with offensive
foreign laws is already softened by an official mechanism that allows for
exceptions to be made in cases where non-compliance would seriously
damage the interests of natural and legal persons covered by the regula-
tion.) Sanctions for those who breach any of the regulation's provisions,
such as the non-compliance provision, are left to the determination of in-
164. Id. art. 11, at 3-4.
165. Id. art. 2, at 2.
166. Id. art. 3, at 2.
167. Council Regulation 2271/96, art. 4, 1996 O.J. (L 309) 1, 2.
168. Id.
169. Id. art. 5, at 2.
170. See Bates, supra note 78.
171. 1996 O.J. (L 309) art. 5, at 2.
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dividual member states. 172
The regulation also contains a "clawback" measure whereby those
sued based on a law in the Annex or those whose interests are adversely
affected by the mere application of such a law are entitled to recover any
damages they sustain, including legal costs. 173 The regulation says that
this "clawback" recovery for EU residents and corporations "could take
the form of seizure and sale of assets held by those persons, entities, per-
sons acting on their behalf or intermediaries within the Community, in-
cluding shares held in a legal person incorporated within the Commu-
nity."' 174 Such all-encompassing methods for recovery seem to indicate
that the Council wants to ensure that its countermeasures will have some
deterrent effect and eventual impact if the suspension of Title III of the
Libertad Act is ever lifted and the interests of EU residents and corpora-
tions are damaged by U.S. judgments. The EU regulation does not ad-
dress the Title IV visa ban that is already in operation under the Helms-
Burton Act.' 75
The preface to the regulation refers specifically to three articles of
the EC Treaty upon which the European Council relied on for the author-
ity to issue the countermeasures in the regulation. 76 The underlying basis
for the Council's authority, Article 235, is the catch-all provision which
confers on the Council the power to take any action, for which no au-
thorization is given elsewhere in the EC Treaty and which proves neces-
sary to attain a Community objective. 177 Secondly, Article 73c of the EC
Treaty is mentioned. 78 Article 73c provides that whenever the Council
seeks to ratify measures "which constitute a step back in Community
law as regards the liberalization of the movement of capital to or from
third countries," unanimity is required rather than just the approval of a
majority or a qualified majority. 17 9 Thus, the unanimity requirement for
172. Id. art. 9, at 3.
173. Id. art. 6, at 2.
174. Id. at 3.
175. Under Title IV, several well-known "EU executives have been refused entry to
the United States because they are associated with companies which have investments in
Cuba." Euro-Mps to Push for Swift Action on Cuba Law, REUTER EuROPEAN COMMUNrrY
REPORT, Sept. 25, 1996, available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, REUEC File.
176. 1996 O.J. (L 309) at 1.
177. Id.; see generally EC Treaty, supra note 146, art. 235.
178. 1996 O.J. (L 309) at 1.
179. EC Treaty, supra note 146, art. 73c. Unless otherwise specified in the EC
Treaty, the European Council may act by a majority of its members. Id. art. 148. Where
the Council is required to act by a qualified majority, the votes of each of the member
states are weighted. Id. Specifications govern how many total votes are needed to achieve
a qualified majority and dictate from how many member states these votes must come.
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the passage of the countermeasures stemmed from two separate articles
of the EC Treaty. 80
Finally, the preface refers to Article 113 of the EC Treaty.' 8' It pro-
vides the Council with the power to ratify regulations implementing the
"common commercial policy" of the EU in accordance with' proposals
from the European Commission. 8 2 Countermeasures to the Libertad Act
presumably fall into the category of common commercial policy, such
that Article 113 could serve as an additional or alternative basis of au-
thorization for their implementation.
2. Canadian and Mexican Blocking Legislation
In September 1996, Canada introduced a bill to amend its Foreign
Extraterritorial Measures Act (FEMA), legislation enacted in 1985 to deal
with infringements on Canadian sovereignty by foreign laws, in order to
counter the impact of the Libertad Act on Canadian business. 8 3 The pro-
posed amendments to FEMA entered into effect on January 1, 1997.184
On this date, the Canadian Foreign Affairs Minister, Mr. Lloyd
Axworthy, summed up his government's approach to Cuba: "These
amendments send an important signal that Canada continues its vigorous
opposition to Helms-Burton .... Canada still believes that the best way
to encourage democratic development in Cuba is through engagement
and dialogue."' 85 Canada likes to point out that this argument is similar
to the one which the United States uses to renew its most-favored-nation
trading status with communist China.8 6
The FEMA amendments give the Canadian Attorney General the au-
thority to block any attempt by a foreign claimant to enforce a Libertad
Act judgment in Canada and to forbid compliance by Canadian nationals
and corporations with extraterritorial measures that endanger Canadian
sovereignty. 8 7 For example, if a U.S. head office advises a Canadian sub-
sidiary to decline investment in Cuba, the Canadian subsidiary must re-
Id.
180. Id. arts. 73c and 235.
181. 1996 O.J. (L 309) at 1.
182. EC Treaty, supra note 146, art. 113.
183. See Canada Announces Measures to Combat Helms-Burton Act, supra note 87.
184. EU/EuropelCuba, REUTER TExrLiNE AGENCE EUROPE, Jan. 7, 1996, available in
LEXIS, World Library, TXTNWS File.
185. EU/United States/Cuba, REUTER TExTLINF AGENCE EUROPE, Jan. 7, 1997, avail-
able in LEXIS, World Library, TXTNWS File.
186. Merrill Goozner, U.S. Law Fails to Scare Canada Firms Out of Cuba; Helms-
Burton Act Ignored as Trade Between Two Picks Up, CHICAGO TRIB., June 16, 1997, at 4.
187. See Canada Announces Measures to Combat Helms-Burton Act, supra note 87.
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port the directive to the Canadian government, and it must defy its parent
or its executives face a $10,000 fine or risk a five year prison term. 88
The amendments also include a "clawback" feature which gives Cana-
dian companies and individuals a recourse in Canadian courts if an
award were made against them in the U.S.8 9 The amendments call for a
schedule to be maintained listing objectionable foreign legislation that vi-
olates international law according to the Attorney General. 190 Lastly, the
existing FEMA fines that can be levied against Canadians who comply
with objectionable foreign laws were increased to deter Canadians from
doing so.191
The new Canadian countermeasures have already found the spotlight
in a legal battle involving Wal-Mart.'9 After a customer in a Canadian
Wal-Mart told a store manager that selling Cuban-made pajamas might
be a violation of the Helms-Burton Act, the manager pulled the pajamas
from the shelf. 93 The incident escalated in the climate of hostility to-
wards extraterritorial American laws, and Wal-Mart Canada, a wholly
owned subsidiary of the U.S. corporation based in Arkansas, opted to re-
move Cuban-made pajamas from stores across Canada in March 1997
out of concern that it might be violating any one of a number of Ameri-
can embargo laws by selling the pajamas. 94 The Company then reversed
its decision and put the 'Cuban pajamas back into circulation to avoid vi-
olating the Canadian FEMA amendments which were designed to prevent
compliance with the U.S.'s extraterritorial anti-Cuba laws. 95 By reversing
its decision, Wal-Mart Canada defied an order by its American parent to
keep the pajamas out of circulation in order to reflect its "commitment
to meet the expectations of the Canadian marketplace."' ' 96
Interestingly, the sale of the pajamas was already illegal under U.S.
laws predating the Helms-Burton Act. 197 However, when the Helms-
Burton Act further extended the extraterritorial application of U.S. law,
Canada was no longer willing to ignore the infringement of its sover-
188. Susan Riggs, Will Obscure Canadian Law Bring U.S. Policy to Heel?, BALTI-
MORE SUN, Jan. 5, 1997, at 5F.
189. See Canada Announces Measures to Combat Helms-Burton Act, supra note 87.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. See Howard Schneider, Canada, U.S. Wager Diplomatic Capital in a High
Stakes Pajama Game, WASH. POST, Mar. 14, 1997, at A29.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
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eignty and consequently adopted countermeasures. 98 "The Cuba-Canada
link has become a badge of honor among Canadians."' 199
Under Mexican blocking legislation passed the week of October 4,
1996, non-compliance fines similar to those set up by the Canadian legis-
lation range up to $300,000.200 This potential financial penalty has placed
several Mexican executives in a situation which parallels the type of no
win scenario faced by Wal-Mart Canada: if they pull out of Cuba to re-
ceive the visas that their families require to travel to the United States,
then they subject themselves to heavy fines by their own government. 20'
Mexico is also experiencing "hypersensitivity" to American med-
dling in its internal affairs. 202 Anti-American sentiment is so pervasive
that "Burton Helms," a caricatured American who is culturally insensi-
tive and arrogant, is being used in ads by Mexico's telephone monopoly
to ward off foreign competitors such as AT&T and MCI.203 This example
is one more manifestation of the resentment sparked by the Helms-
Burton Act.
B. The WTO Complaint
Neither the EU countries nor Canada and Mexico have been able to*
overcome the shortfall that their "clawback" measures will only be ef-
fective if the U.S. claimant at issue has assets subject to the jurisdiction
of their courts. For this reason, the filing of a complaint before the World
Trade Organization was a crucial second tier attack on the Libertad Act;
an adverse WTO decision against the United States is perhaps the only
way to make it feel the full effects of its violations of international law.
1. Why an Adverse Verdict Will Matter
The World Trade Organization was created during the Uruguay
Round as a replacement for the GATT system of enforcing trade rules. 204
198. Id.
199. E.A. Torriero, U.S. Finds Itself Stuck in the Middle; Relationship Between
Cuba, Canada is Galling to Many, SUN-SENrINEL (Fort Lauderdale), Mar. 2, 1997, at IA.
200. Mary Beth Sheridan, Cuba Wrangle Puts Mexicans in the Middle, L.A. TIMES,
Oct. 4, 1996, at D1.
201. See id. (recounting the dilemma of a Mexican phone company executive for
Grupos Domos who has been warned by the U.S. government to drop the company's Cu-
ban investment or lose his children's visas to attend American schools).
202. Howard LaFranchi, Mexicans Air Gripes of U.S. with Style, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE
MONITOR, Mar. 10, 1997, at 7.
203. Id.
204. Andrew Alexander, Clinton Must Not Drag Us into His Cuba Crisis, DAILY
MAIL, Oct. 24, 1996, at 69.
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One of the mechanisms that the WTO framework established to accom-
plish this goal was the dispute settlement panel. At first sight, the WTO
dispute panel seems to suffer from the same lack of enforcement power
as other proclaimers of international law, for its decisions are not binding
in the domestic courts of its member states.205 The Statement of Adminis-
trative Action accompanying the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, which
was prepared for Congress, spells out this limitation:
Reports issued by panels or the Appellate Body under the DSU
have no binding effect under the laws of the United States. They
are no different in this respect than those issued by GATT panels
since 1947. If a report recommends that the United States change
federal law to bring it into conformity with a Uruguay Round
agreement, it is for Congress to decide whether any such change
will be made. 206
The Clinton Administration has even gone so far as to say that it does
not "believe anything the WTO says or does can force the [United
States] to change its laws." 20 7 Despite the fact that dispute settlement
panel decisions are not binding in domestic U.S. courts, there are several
reasons why the filing of a WTO complaint still holds promise as a way
of forcing the repeal of Title III.
To begin, the dispute resolution panel procedure provides for alter-
native methods of policing in the event that a government refuses to re-
move a measure that a panel has found to be inconsistent with a Uruguay
Round agreement. 20 8 The alternative methods include "the provision of
trade compensation and other negotiated settlements [to the injured na-
tions], or the suspension of benefits equivalent to the 'nullification or im-
pairment' of benefits caused by the offending measure." 209 When com-
bined with the moral pressure applied by all member nations to obey a
WTO decision, a government's fear of losing the advantages of such
205. See, e.g., H.R. Doc. No. 316, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 1008 (explaining that the
WTO cannot diminish U.S. sovereignty because "the new WTO dispute settlement sys-
tem does not give panels any power to order the United States or other countries to
change their laws. If a panel finds that a country has not lived up to its commitments, all
a panel may do is recommend that the country begin observing its obligations. It is then
up to the disputing countries to decide how they will settle their differences."). For the
text of the Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations of the WTO Agreement, see id. at 1326-36.
206. Id. at 1036.
207. Sanger, supra note 26.
208. H.R. Doe. No. 316, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 1032.
209. Id.
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tariff concessions and other GATT benefits provides a powerful tool with
which to compel compliance with the panel's verdict.210 The moral pres-
sure to comply is intense, for the GATT and WTO agreements were
hammered out in painstaking negotiations which give them a legacy of
validity and solid international consensus on the underlying rules.
2 1
'
Faced with a growing WTO case before the dispute settlement
panel, the United States risks much by lifting the suspension of Title III.
In addition, American claimants, who might previously have salivated at
the thought of filing Title III claims, must now factor into their decision
to pursue claims the negative repercussions which may follow in the
form of "alternative resolutions" by the WTO panel who finds against
the United States.
Finally, acting to empower the dispute resolution panel is the as-
sumption that the contracting parties to the WTO agreements will oppose
the weakening of respect for these obligations, for this will undermine
the foundation on which the agreements rest.21 2 "If respect for rules and
commitments is eroded, if member countries hesitate to intervene when
there is a breach of the legal rule simply to keep open the possibility of
circumventing the rule themselves, the means of constraint must lose a
great part of their force and effectiveness.
213
2. Abusing the National Security Exception
The U.S. has threatened to plead a "national security" exception
based on Article 21 of the GATT as a possible way to avoid having the
Helms-Burton and other embargo legislation examined from the point of
view of WTO trade rules.2 14 This means that the WTO dispute settlement
panel will have to decide whether the wording of Article 21 allows the
panel to examine the substantive legitimacy of such a national security
defense or whether the panel is simply bound to accept the defense at
face value.21 5 The United States argues that the panel must do the latter
since a national security defense is a political issue rather than a matter
210. See OLIVIER LONG, LAW AND ITS LIMITATIONS 67 (1987).
211. See id. (making this argument for GAIT only); see also Averting Trade Wars,
WASH. POST, Oct. 21, 1996, at A18 (acknowledging the arduous negotiation process un-
derlying the creation of the WTO dispute settlement panel).
212. See LONG, supra note 210, at 67.
213. Id. "Meaningful constraint requires consensus among the member countries on
the objectives of the treaty and the means of attaining them, as well as on the extent of
their application." Id.
214. Robert Evans, U.S., EU to Meet at WTO on Cuba Dispute-Diplomats, REUTERS
MoNFE REP., Feb. 3, 1997, available in LEXIS, World Library, REUFIN File.
215. Id.
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for trade panelists to decide.21 6 On the other hand, those who advocate
that the panel does have the authority to review the factual underpinnings
of the asserted national security defense contend that, while legislation
enforcing a trade embargo might be shielded from panel scrutiny by such
a defense, legislation providing for claim damages for past foreign in-
vestment surely is not implicated by the national security exception.
217
In the eyes of many nations as well as WTO Director-General
Renato Ruggiero, abusing this fifty-year-old GATT loophole 21 by invok-
ing it as a defense to the EU's case places the United States in the posi-
tion of having begun the deterioration of the WTO trade rules.219 The
United States' action has opened the door for all future defendants to as-
sert the national security exception to "defend domestic sacred cows. 220
For example, Japan could formally raise this exception to keep its rice
market closed to imports based on a justification of safeguarding "food
security," or South Korea could make a parallel argument to continue
sheltering its car industry from foreign imports.22' In this, scenario, the
United States hurts itself above all others since early results from the
WTO dispute resolution panel show that it is working well and that U.S.
companies are benefitting more than most.222 The United States finds it-
self the complainant far more often than the defendant in matters of for-
eign trade practices before the WTO. 223
3. Procedural Fights and a Fragile Truce
In October 1996, the EU launched the formal procedure to call for
the opening of a WTO dispute settlement panel 224 and was soon joined
by Canada.25 On November 20, 1996, the dispute settlement body of the
WTO officially agreed to set up an adjudication panel in response to the
216. See id.
217. See Cuban Feud, FIN. TIMEs (London), Feb. 4, 1997, at 21.
218. See EU Puts U.S. 'Bully' in the WTO Dock: Guy de Jonquie'res and Lionel
Barber on Europe's Frustration, FIN. TIMES (London), Oct. 3, 1996, at 5.
219. See Robert Evans, U.S., Angry With EU, Expected to Ignore WTO on Cuba,
REUTERS FIN. SERVICE, Money Rep. Sec., Feb. 4, 1997, available in LEXIS, World Li-
brary, TXTLNE File.
220. Averting Trade Wars, supra note 211.
221. Sanger, supra note 26.
222. See Averting Trade Wars, supra note 211.
223. See Sanger, supra note 26.
224. EP Committee Hears Brittan on U.S. Trade Action, REUTER EUR. COMMUNITY
REP., July 26, 1996, available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, REUEC File.
225. Canada Joins EU Challenge on U.S. Law on Cuba, REUTER EUR. COMMUNITY
REP., Oct. 2, 1996, available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, REUEC File.
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EU's complaint.2 26 The United States showed its anger over the EU's
complaint by devising a procedural deadlock on the issue of the compo-
sition of the three-member panel.227 This resulted in months of delay in
the panel's substantive task.22 In February 1997, the EU moved to end
the stalemate by requesting that the WTO Director-General personally
nominate the panel members.229 This action would have required the Di-
rector-General to name the panel's constituents within ten days;230 how-
ever, the EU asked for a last minute delay to foster a possible compro-
mise.231 As no deal was struck, the panel was subsequently appointed.
232
Failing a friendly resolution by the EU and the United States, the panel
was to have rendered a verdict by August 20, 1997,233 if not for a subse-
quent truce.
234
In April 1997, months of negotiation between the United States and
the EU produced a fragile truce under the terms of which the EU sus-
pended its WTO complaint until October 15, 1997 in exchange for the
Clinton Administration's promise to ask Congress to amend the Helms-
Burton legislation to meet EU objections. 235
In the interim, the EU has been collecting information to use in its
case before the WTO dispute panel since October 1996.236 The breadth of
226. See Clinton Likely to Continue Softly-Softly Approach to Anti-Cuba Law, EUR.
RFP., Jan. 4, 1997, available in LEXIS, World Library, EURRPT File.
227. See Evans, supra note 219.
228. See EU to Press Ruggiero on Panel for U.S. Anti-Cuba Laws, EUR. REP., Feb.
5, 1997, available in LEXIS, World Library, EURRPT File.
229. See Cuban Feud, supra note 217, at 21.
230. See EU Calls on Mr. Ruggiero to Appoint Members of the Panel That Will
Give Its Position on the Helms-Burton (Cuba) Law, REUTERS TEXTLINE, Feb. 4, 1997,
available in LEXIS, World Library, TXTLNE File.
231. See David Sanger, Europe Postpones Challenge to U.S. on Havana Trade, N.Y.
TIMS, Feb. 13, 1997, at Al.
232. See Sanger, supra note 26.
233. REUTERS TExTLINE, supra note 230.
234. Keeping the Lid on Helms-Burton, FIN. TiMEs (London), July 31, 1997, at 4.
235. Id. The terms of the temporary truce reached between the EU and the United
States are complicated by the EU's fight against another extraterritorially applied Ameri-
can law, the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act. Id. If the United States does not soon waive provi-
sions which levy penalties on foreign companies investing in the energy sectors of Iran
and Libya, the EU may pressure the United States into doing so by threatening to rein-
state the Helms-Burton complaint with the WTO. Id.
236. Appeal for information concerning the effects on Community enterprises of the
Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 of the United States of America
and of other measures taken by the United States affecting trade with Cuba, 1996 O.J. (C
307) 4 [hereinafter "Appeal"]. Specifically, the Commission seeks facts about adverse ef-
fects of "prohibitions on export to Cuba, prohibitions on imports into the USA of mer-
chandise made or derived in whole or in part of any article which is the growth, produce,
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the European Commission's call for information suggests that it might in-
corporate the extraterritorial effects of previous embargo legislation into
its WTO complaint as well. 237 Canada's participation in the WTO com-
plaint as an interested third party means the dispute settlement panel will
also take into account the Canadian government's submissions in its final
report.
238
4. The EU's Strongest Arguments
Regardless of how expansive the EU case becomes, several argu-
ments have already been identified as its core elements. The EU is likely
to contend that by interfering with trade between the EU and Cuba, the
U.S. is violating Article 11 of the GATT. 239 A second count will likely
allege that even if the U.S. has not broken any specific WTO rule, its ac-
tions have "nullified and impaired the benefits that the EU might reason-
ably have expected from U.S. trade commitments. ' ' 240 The "nullified and
impaired" clause stems from the language of Article 23 of the GATT. If
the EU employs such an argument, it will carry the burden of providing
a detailed justification of the nullified or impaired benefits accruing to it
under the GATT.241 To the extent that this includes proving a chill in the
willingness of EU companies to expand investment in Cuba due to Title
HI1, it will be a difficult burden to shoulder.242
or manufacture of Cuba, denial of access to the quota for the import of sugar into the
USA, and restrictions on entry into ports of the USA and access to port facilities for
ships which have visited Cuba or have been carrying Cuban goods." Id.
In addition to this appeal for information, the European Commission is also compil-
ing for publication a list of the names of U.S. citizens and companies who will be filing
Title III actions. Notice concerning the publication of a list of citizens and companies fil-
ing actions under Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996,
Appeal, 1996 O.J. (C 276) 5. This watchlist will be one of a number of non-legal re-
sponses to counter the damage to EU citizens and companies under the Helms-Burton
Act.
237. Appeal, 1996 O.J. (C 307) 4.
238. See Clinton Likely to Continue Softly-Softly Approach to Anti-Cuba Law, supra
note 226.
239. See U.S.-EU Trade War Unlikely to Erupt, supra note 87, at 28.
240. Id.
241. See LONG, supra note 210, at 76 (explaining that if the complainant brings an
Article 23 claim alleging that measures which do not actually conflict with the provisions
of the GATT have nullified or impaired benefits accruing to the complainant under the
GAIT, then the complainant carries the burden of providing a detailed justification for
bringing the action). Normally, the complainant enjoys a presumption that its benefits
have been nullified and impaired if it alleges that the opposing party has breached the
GAIT rules. Id.
242. See id. at 75.
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The American reaction to the filing of the WTO complaint has re-
mained unchanged since its initial response, which came from the U.S.
ambassador to the WTO.243 The ambassador expressed surprise that the
EU was airing its "tactical and foreign policy differences over Cuba"
before a multi-lateral trade forum.244 The United States maintains that the
Libertad Act provisions have nothing to do with trade because they are
not protectionist barriers to shield American industry from foreign com-
petition. 245 This argument is mere rhetoric. Viewed in light of the history
of the GATT panel system, the EU action of bringing a complaint before
the WTO dispute resolution panel is perfectly appropriate. Although the
EU's case will have political overtones relating to the reasons for the em-
bargo, the practical effects of Title III and the provisions of past embargo
statutes, such as the Cuban Democracy Act, fall squarely within the
realm of a trade dispute. GAIT panels, the largely comparable forerunner
to the WTO dispute settlement panels, proved adept at handling this vol-
atile mix:
The panel system has resolved many differences between GAT'T
member countries over the years that have threatened friction and
even disorder in trade relations. . . . The issues are invariably
sensitive with political overtones. They are always difficult, oth-
erwise they would not come before a panel. As often as not, po-
litically important sectoral interests are involved. 246
VI. CONCLUSION
Throughout the congressional debate, Senator Dodd repeatedly
raised two questions for considering whether the Helms-Burton bill de-
served Congress's support: 1) Is what it proposes to accomplish in the
best interests of the United States?; and 2) Is it likely to achieve the de-
sired results in Cuba? 247 This comment demonstrates how the Libertad
Act is a failure in both respects. U.S. interests are best served by main-
taining a healthy relationship with trading partners and supporting the
promising international trade dispute resolution mechanisms set up by the
WTO, from which the United States has already benefitted in several
cases. Unilateral sanctions against Cuba of the type envisioned by Title
243. Gustavo Capdevila, Former Allies Split by the Blockade on Cuba, INTER PRESS
SERVICE, OCt. 16, 1996, available in LEXIS, World Library, INPRES File.
244. Id.
245. See Sanger, supra note 26.
246. LONG, supra note 210, at 84.
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III of the Libertad Act, founded on extraterritorial application of U.S. law
through private civil remedies against foreigners, benefit only a small
contingent of wealthy American claimants with negligible effect on tight-
ening the embargo and at enormous international political cost.
The initial justification for the Act-the deterring of foreign invest-
ment in Cuba by way of private Title III actions-has been marred by
the ratification of blocking legislation by key U.S. trading partners whose
nationals do substantial business with Cuba and by the exploitation of
loopholes in the Act. Fortunately, the Clinton Administration has steered
a course of resuspending the most offending part of the Libertad Act, Ti-
tle I 24--a trend that will likely continue presuming a minimum of co-
operation from Congress. This course of action leaves intact the lesser ef-
fects of the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 and prior embargo legislation
as well as the annoying but less damaging Title IV visa ban until the
United States rids itself of its obsession with isolating Cuba. The current
U.S. policy toward Cuba is forcing American allies to choose between
compromising their sovereignty and condemning Castro to the full extent
possible for his poor human rights record. This gives Castro "larger than
life" status, as exemplified by his recent joint declaration with the Cana-
dian government announcing the strenthening of ties.249 Meanwhile, the
furor over Helms-Burton is highlighting overreaching U.S. laws totally
unrelated to Cuba and fueling international perception of the United
States as not only a cultural imperialist but a growing legal imperialist.
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